whether-private-attorneys-conspiring-with-clerk-of-court-for-favorable-judgment-violates-supremacy-clause

QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 1) Whether as a matter of first impression, are 5-private attorneys who fraudulently conspired with a Clerk of Court in a lawsuit for the sole . purpose of obtaining a favorable final judgment on June 6, 2013 for their client, were subsequently liable for their conspiratorial and fraudulent conduct in a June 15, 2015 independent cause of action brought by the injured adverse party under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, violates the Supremacy Clause to the United States Constitution when Massachusetts court accorded . those 5-attorneys and the Clerk of Court absolute immunity under the State's so-called "litigation privilege" defense allowing them, upon : their oath, to lie in any court pleading, is. in violation of this Court's precedent in Tower v. Glover, that "42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides that every person who acts under color of state law to deprive another Of constitutional rights shall be liable in suit for damages,“! and in Martinez v. California,, that "conduct by per-sons acting under state law which is wrongful under 42:U.S.6. § 1983 ... cannot be‘ immuned by state law."?2 T 467 U.S. 919-920" conspiracy allegations cast the color of state . law over the [Respondents'] actions"). : 2 444 U.S. 277, 284 n. 8 (1080). ii 2) Whether a "fraud on the court" claim, when briefed and opposed must be reviewed and decided by an appellate court on the merits without recharacterizing the claim as one for simple "fraud" in order to. take wrongful advantage of the one-year time limitation specified in Mass. R. Civ. P. 60(b), is contrary to fair procedure guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, when the "saving clause" to Rule 60(b)(3) does not apply any time limitation to an "independent action," violates this Court's legal precedent in Castro vUnited States, that "a court can: not so recharacterize a pro se litigant's [ples: ding] ... unless the court provides the 1litigant a reasonable opportunity to withdraw, or to amend the filing,"3 and United States v. Beqgerly, that "[i]ndependent actions ... must be preserved for those cases of injustices’ ?4 3) Whether Massachusetts courts are oblibated to abide by the "saving clause" in Mass R. Civ. P. 60(b)(3) which has no time limitation for an "independent action."5 3 540 U.S. 375, 377 (2003). 4 524 U.S. 38, 46 (1998). 5 See Reporter's Notes "The saving clause in Rule 60(b) which allows the court to set aside a judgment for fraud on the court contains no time limit. Likewise, the time limitation of Rule 60(b) do not apply to the independent action preserved by the rules. iii 4) Whether a pro se prisoner litigant's affidavit and request for entry of default and judgment by default under Mass. R. Civ. P. 55 (a)(b)(1) was sufficient as a matter of law to have put 5-private attorneys and the clerk of court on notice that the plaintiff was requesting entry of default and judgment by default, “bythe clerk," and whether the clerk of court's refusal to enter a pre se litigant's motion for entry and judgment by default on grounds that "[t]he default which you requested pursuant to Rule 55(a) of Mass. R. Civ. P. has not been =:-ln enteréd for the following reason(s) No return receipt and no request for default," violates this Court's legal precedent in Haines v. Kerner, that pro se pleadings are heid to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafter by lawyers?6 5) Whether the Massachusetts Appeals Court. ::.:’ abused its. discretion OF made a clear error of : law by ruling that:""The limitations period begins to run even if the consequences of the triggered injury are not yet felt."? 6 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972).