Does Arizona's statutory scheme, which excludes sexual motivation as an element of child molestation, unconstitutionally shift the burden of proof on the essential element of sexual motivation to the accused in contravention of an accused's guaranteed Due Process rights under the 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution?

QUESTION PRESENTED FOR REVIEW Petitioner was sentenced to thirty years in prison following a jury’s verdict finding him guilty of six counts of child molestation of a victim under fifteen years old. At the close of trial, the court instructed the jury, consistent with Arizona statutes, that “[tlhe crime of child molestation requires proof of the following: [tlhe defendant intentionally or knowingly engaged in or caused a person to engage in any direct or indirect touching, fondling or manipulation of any part of the genitals or anus by any part of the body or by any object with a child.” The court conspicuously left out that to constitute child molestation, any touching must be done with sexual motivation. In Arizona, pursuant to statute, sexual motivation is not an element of a child molestation offense, but rather an affirmative defense to such molestation. This case presents the following question: Does Arizona’s statutory scheme, which excludes sexual motivation as an element of child molestation, unconstitutionally shift the burden of proof on the essential element of sexual motivation to the accused in contravention of an accused’s guaranteed Due Process rights under the 14 Amendment to the United States | Constitution? | i