Where the credited, credible, and unassailable evidence at trial proves with certainty that a lethal injection protocol will inflict severe pain and mental anguish on an inmate

QUESTIONS PRESENTED ‘It is uncontested that, failing a proper dose of sodium thiopental that would render the prisoner unconscious, there is a substantial, constitutionally unacceptable risk of suffocation from the administration of pancuronium bromide and pain from the injection of potassium chloride." Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 53 (2008) (emphasis added). The Questions Presented are? 1. Where the credited, credible, and unassailable evidence at trial proves with certainty that a lethal injection protocol will inflict severe pain and mental anguish on an inmate by causing the inmate to feel and experience pulmonary edema (drowning in one’s own fluids) from midazolam, suffocation and paralysis (described as being buried alive) from vecuronium bromide, and chemical burning (the severity of which has been described as being burned alive from the inside) from potassium chloride, does that protocol violate the Eighth Amendment regardless of whether the inmate has demonstrated a feasible readily implemented alternative? 2. Did Glossip v. Gross, 576 U.S. __, 135 S.Ct. 2726 (2015), hold that there are no methods of execution which are categorically prohibited by the Eighth Amendment, overruling centuries of precedent? 3. Did Glossip relieve states from any obligation under the Eighth Amendment to engage in a good-faith search for humane forms of execution and shift that burden to inmates, transforming the Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment of the Eighth Amendment into a conditional protection? 4. Is an inmate deprived of fundamental due process under the Fourteenth Amendment, when he is effectively prevented from establishing the existence of a feasible and readily implemented alternative by 1) state secrecy laws preventing discovery of willing drug suppliers, 2) the state’s refusal to affirm or deny their ability to secure alternative drugs, 3) a rushed litigation schedule, which precludes full factual development, and 4) the Tennessee court’s perverse and unworkable interpretation of Glossip. 5. Where the State deprives an inmate’s attorney of telephone access during an execution for the express purpose of preventing the attorney from calling the court, does the State violate the inmate’s constitutional right of access to the courts?