Glen St. Andrew Living Community, LLC, et al. v. Marsha Wetzel
SocialSecurity EmploymentDiscrimina
Whether discriminatory intent is required under the Fair Housing Act Sections 3604(b) and 3617
QUESTIONS PRESENTED This is a case of first impression and national importance affecting the entire United States housing industry. It concerns who can be held liable under the Fair Housing Act (“FHA”), and what kind of conduct is actionable after a dwelling has been purchased or leased. In this case, the Seventh Circuit broadly construed the FHA to eliminate what most courts have held to be an essential element of a claim under Sections 3604(b) and 3617—discriminatory intent. The effect is to dramatically expand the scope of the FHA and allow a new and unexpected duty to be imposed on housing providers to guarantee nondiscriminatory living environments, by intervening in known tenant-on-tenant harassment to end the unlawful acts of unrelated third parties over whom the housing provider has little or no control. The newly created duty lacks discernible limits; landlords can now be held strictly liable for unlawful conduct by others that they did not participate in or create. The questions presented are: 1. By making it unlawful to discriminate because of a protected trait, did Congress require an FHA plaintiff to plead and prove discriminatory intent on the part of the actor sought to be held liable under Sections 3604(b) and 3617? 2. Whether the scope of the FHA can be expanded to impose a duty on housing providers to intervene in and end known discrimination committed by unrelated third-parties after a tenant has taken occupancy of her dwelling? (i)