Ricardo Lupian-Barajas v. Julie L. Jones, Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections, et al.
DueProcess HabeasCorpus Securities JusticiabilityDoctri
Did the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit depart from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings when it failed to state the reasons why a certificate of appealability should not issue as required by Fed.R.App.P. 22 (b)?
QUESTION(S) PRESENTED L DID THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT DEPART FROM THE ACCEPTED AND USUAL COURSE OF JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS WHEN IT FAILED TO STATE THE REASONS WHY A CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY SHOULD NOT ISSUE AS REQUIRED BY FED.R.APP.P. 22 (B)? itt DID THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT ERR WHEN IT CONCLUDED THAT THE DISTRICT COURT’S ASSESSMENT OF GROUND ONE WAS NOT DEBATABLE OR THAT THE STATE COURT’S DECISION WAS NOT CONTRARY TO OR AN UNREASONABLE APPLICATION OF THE CLEARLY ESTABLISHED SUPREME COURT LAW ANNOUNCED IN STRICKLAND WHEN IT DENIED MR. LUPIAN’S CLAIM THAT TRIAL COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE FOR FAILING TO LOCATE AND PRESENT MR. MATTA TO SUPPORT HIS SELF DEFENSE THEORY. THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT ERRED WHEN RULING ON PETITIONER’S APPLICATION FOR CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY 28 U.S.C. 2253 (c) (2) m . DID THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT ERR WHEN IT CONCLUDED THAT THE DISTRICT COURT’S ASSESSMENT OF GROUND TWO WAS NOT DEBATABLE OR THAT THE STATE COURT’S DECISION WAS NOT CONTRARY TO OR AN UNREASONABLE APPLICATION OF THE CLEARLY ESTABLISHED SUPREME COURT LAW ANNOUNCED IN STRICKLAND WHEN IT DENIED MR. LUPIAN’S CLAIM THAT TRIAL COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE FOR FAILING TO LOCATE AND PRESENT MR. APOLINAR SANCHEZ TO SUPPORT HIS SELF DEFENSE THEORY. THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT ERRED WHEN RULING ON PETITIONER’S APPLICATION FOR CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY 28 U.S.C. 2253 (c) (2) ii IV DID THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT ERR WHEN IT CONCLUDED THAT THE DISTRICT COURT’S ASSESSMENT OF GROUND THREE WAS NOT DEBATABLE OR THAT THE STATE COURT’S DECISION WAS NOT CONTRARY TO OR AN UNREASONABLE APPLICATION OF THE CLEARLY ESTABLISHED SUPREME COURT LAW ANNOUNCED IN STRICKLAND WHEN IT DENIED MR. LUPIAN’S CLAIM THAT TRIAL COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE FOR FAILING TO OBJECT WHEN THE PROSECUTOR INTERJECTED HIS PERSONAL OPINION THAT MR. LUPIAN WAS A LIAR DURING CLOSING ARGUMENTS . THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT ERRED WHEN RULING ON PETITIONER’S APPLICATION FOR CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY 28 U.S.C. 2253 (c) (2) iii