No. 18-6338

Briand Williams v. Superior Court of California, Los Angeles County, et al.

Lower Court: California
Docketed: 2018-10-16
Status: Denied
Type: IFP
Response WaivedIFP
Tags: appellate-counsel contract contract-law due-process equal-protection habeas-corpus jurisdiction jurisdictional-challenge plea-bargain statute-of-limitations
Key Terms:
DueProcess HabeasCorpus
Latest Conference: 2018-11-30
Question Presented (AI Summary)

Is a Plea Bargain Agreement a contract between the defendant and the prosecutor on behalf of the State, and can the defendant be relieved from the restraints of the agreement when the Statute of Limitations is Jurisdictional in nature and the court lacked jurisdiction to prosecute the matter

Question Presented (from Petition)

QUESTION(S) PRESENTED 1) Is a Plea Bargain Agreement in essence a contract between the defendant and the prosecutor on behalf of the Statefq And if so, can the defendant be relieved from the restraints of the agreement when the Statute of Limitations is Jurisdictional in nature, and where the court had lacked jurisdiction to prosecute the matter, Can a defendant be forced and bound to the plea agreement where the Statute of Limitation is was Longer in existence after three (3) years, three (3) months, and fifteen (15) days. See Cal. Pen. Code §§800-802 and §804; Statute of Limitations (1935) 23 Cal. L. Rev. at pp 525-527; In re Harris (1993) 5 C. 4" 813, IiN@IM; People vs. Chapman (1975) 47 CA 3d 597; People vs. Hoffman (1933) 132 CA 60; People vs. Lynch (2010) 182 CA 4" 1262; People vs. Sup. Ct. (Meeks) (1991) 1 C. 4" 56, 66 IEINES; United States vs. Williams (1951) 341 US 58, 68; In re Albert B. Demillo (1975) 14 C. 3d 598; People vs. Miller (1859) 12 C. 291; People vs. Picetti (1899) 124 C. 361; Ex parte Vice (1901) 5 C. 153; People vs. McGee (1934) 1 C. 2d 611; People vs. Rose (1972) 28 CA 3d 414; People vs. Morgan (1977) 75 CA 3d 32; People vs. Chadd (1981) 28 3d 739; People vs. Brice (1988) 206 CA 3d 111; People vs. Angel (1999) 70 Cal. 4" 1141; People vs. Williams (1999) 21 C. 4" 335; Sanders vs. Sup. Ct. (1999) 76 CA 4” 609; Kellett vs. Sup. Ct. (1966) 63 C. 2d 822; In re Davis (1936) 13 CA 2d 109; In re McVickers (1946) 29 C. 2d 264, 274, 280; In re Carmen (1957) 48 C. 2d 851, 854; People vs. Crosby (1962) 58 C. 2d 713, 724-725; But, Under the Color of Law Is the Defendant entitled under the Equal Protection Analysis and Due Process Clause of our United States Constitution; entitled to an Evidentiary Hearing to make a conclusive finding to determine whether the plea bargain between the defendant and the People for the State of California can be enforced even after the State of Calif. Statute of Limitations has long ran outfgay 2) Once a plea agreement has been reached, can the District Attorney’s office Renege on the ORIGINAL agreement long after the defendant has full-filled his part of the agreement well over twenty-two (22) years ago after the bargain was reached and nearly twenty (20) years after the defendant completed the three (3) full years of Formal Probation under that ORIGINAL aercemen Santobello vs. New York (1971) 404 US 257, 260, 262; United States vs. Paiva (D.D.C. 1969) 294 F. supp.742; People vs. Cortez (1970) 13 CA 3d 317; Buckley vs, Terhune (9" Cir. 2006) 441 F.3d 688, 695; citing: Ricketts v. Adamson, (1987) 483 U.S. 1, 6 INBY In California, “[a] negotiated plea agreement is a form of contract, and it is interpreted according to general contract principles,” People v. Shelton (2006) 37 Cal.4th 759, 767, and “according to the same rules as other contracts,” People v. Toscano (2004) 124 CA 4th 340, 344, (cited with approval in Shelton along with other California cases to same effect dating back to 1982). Thus, under Adamson, California courts are required to construe and interpret plea agreements in accordance with state contract law. (See also, Brown vs. Poole (9" Cir. 2003) 337 F.3d 1155, 1159.) 3) Did the agents, representatives, (DA’s office) for the State of California, Revoke the plea bargain agreement without the defendant’s knowledge after the first fourteen (14) years from what the defendant had relied upon in the acceptance from the promises made to him back on July 16", 1996 at the time of sentencing, which was to plead “YES” to a 261.5(c) PC and to be released on that very same day And, can the defendant now be charged continuously with “failure to update registration Annually” where there has never been any [I]nitial or Previous registration to update from ever ~~ in the defendant's entire lifeggg) The term “FOLLOWING REGISTERATION” is ~~ meaningless when there is {[NO!!!]} REGISTRATION to follow. And, Does this PreIndictment Delay which is in Violation if the Due Process & Equal Prote

Docket Entries

2018-12-03
Petition DENIED.
2018-11-08
DISTRIBUTED for Conference of 11/30/2018.
2018-10-24
Waiver of right of respondent Superior Court of California to respond filed.
2018-10-04
Petition for a writ of certiorari and motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis filed. (Response due November 15, 2018)

Attorneys

Briand Williams
Briand Williams — Petitioner
Briand Williams — Petitioner
Superior Court of California
Lance E. WintersCalifornia Attorney General's Office, Respondent
Lance E. WintersCalifornia Attorney General's Office, Respondent