Where the last state court to review the merits of a state prisoner's habeas claim denied relief in a reasoned opinion, may a federal court assume the existence of fact-findings and clear error determinations not contained in the state court's opinion to conclude that the state court's adjudication is reasonable and therefore bars federal relief under § 2254(d)?

QUESTIONS PRESENTED Question 1 In Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86 (2011), this Court announced that where a state court issues a summary denial of a habeas petitioner’s claim unaccompanied by any reasoning, a federal court reviewing that claim under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) determines whether “any reasonable basis” could have supported the denial. If so, the federal court must defer to the state adjudication. Last term, in Wilson v. Sellers, 584 U.S. __, 138 S. Ct. 1188 (2018), this Court rejected the Eleventh Circuit’s expansive application of Richter, clarifying that Richter’s “any reasonable basis” inquiry is limited to the circumstances where no state court has issued a reasoned opinion in support of its adjudication. This Court further noted that where, as in Mr. Morrow’s case, the last state court to adjudicate the merits of the claim did so in a reasoned opinion, review under § 2254(d) is “straightforward.” Id. at 1192. The federal court “simply reviews the specific reasons given by the state court and defers to those reasons if they are reasonable.” Id. The Eleventh Circuit’s opinion affirming Morrow’s denial of habeas relief, issued three weeks prior to Wilson, presents the following question: Where the last state court to review the merits of a state prisoner’s habeas claim denied relief in a reasoned opinion, may a federal court assume the existence of fact-findings and clear error determinations not contained in the state court’s opinion to conclude that the state court’s adjudication is reasonable and therefore bars federal relief under § 2254(d)? i Question 2 This Court has long recognized the uniquely devastating nature of childhood sexual abuse, identifying repeated childhood sexual assault as “powerful” mitigating evidence. Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 535 (2003). Yet the Eleventh Circuit has a consistent practice of refusing to weigh, or sanctioning a state court’s unreasonable discounting of, credible evidence of repeated childhood sexual abuse. This case, therefore, also presents the following question: Whether the Eleventh Circuit erroneously concluded that the Georgia Supreme Court reasonably determined that: a) the fact that Morrow was “the victim of a series of rapes” as a child “would not have been given great weight by the jury,” and b) Morrow’s counsel did not perform deficiently in failing to discover this evidence because Morrow did not volunteer information about his sexual abuse? ii