DueProcess HabeasCorpus
Is a Plea Agreement considered terminated or fulfilled 15 years later upon loss of sentencing transcripts?
QUESTION(S) PRESENTED 1) Is a Plea Agreement considered to be terminated or full-filled fifteen (15) years later upon the destruction or Jost of the actual sentencing plea agreement transcripts or long after the formal probation of three(3) yrs has been completed by the defendant from the date of the plea bargain being entered into back on July 16", 1996; And, If [not]; Does [any] Questionable altered and forged, minute-order(s) which do not reflect the actual [A]greed upon too [C]harge itself from the Plea-Bargain (Would. these minute-orders) carry the very same weight as the Original Certified Transcripts. would have [i]f they were still available??? And, If [not] Is the Defendant entitled under the Equal Protection Analysis and Due Process Clause entitled to an Evidentiary Hearing to make a conclusive finding to determine the representation made by the state officials on whether a plea bargain existed between the defendant and the People for the State of California which did entitle the defendant to plea to a charge that [did] [not] require Registration, and to what extent of the defendant’s reasonable reliance on such representations??? 2) Once a plea agreement has been reached, can the District Attorney’s office Renege on the agreement long after the defendant has full-filled his part of the agreement well over twenty-two (22) years ago after the bargain was reached and nearly twenty (20) years after the defendant completed the three (3) full years of Forma! Probation under that agreement??? Santobello vs. New York (1971) 404 US 257, 260, 262; United States vs. Paiva (D.D.C. 1969) 294 F. supp.742; and People vs. Cortez (1970) 13 Cal. App. 3d 317. 3) Did the agents, representatives, (DA’s office) for the State of California, Revoke the plea bargain agreement without the defendant’s knowledge after the first fourteen (14) years from what the defendant had relied upon in the acceptance from the promises made to him back on July 16", 1996 at the time of sentencing, which was to plead “YES” to a 261.5(c) PC and to be released on that very same day??? Can the defendant now be charged continuously with “failure to update registration Annually” where there has never been any [I]nitial or Previous registration to update from ever in the defendant’s entire life??? The term “FOLLOWING REGISTERATION?” is meaningless when there is {INO!!!]} REGISTRATION to follow. And, Does this PreIndictment Delay which is in Violation if the Due Process entitle the defendant to [w]ithdraw his July 16", 1996 Plea??? 4) Was the defendant entitled under the United States Constitutions’ VI and XIV Amendment to a competent appellate attorney and a record that would permit a meaningful presentation of appellate claims, and that the attorney’s failure to appreciate or correct the shortcomings of the record constituted the inadequate assistance of counsel on appeal??? 5) Was the defendant denied under the Fourteenth Amendment by the State to fullfill its duty to provide appellant with a complete and effective appellant record??? 6) Was the defendant put in any unfavorable appellate proceedings that were fundamentally unfair in contravention of the Due Process Clauses of the Federal Constitution??? 7) Was the defendant deprived of a adequate competent active advocate assistance by appointed appellate counsel by right under the sixth amendment??? _ 8) Was the defendant deprived and denied any right(s) under California’s Independent Constitution??? 9) Is a defendant denied a Due Process right to have a Habeas Corpus Petition filed concurrently with his direct appeal by his appointed appellate counsel when the issues and facts that warrants’ the filing for the petition is surrounded by issues being [e]xtrinsic from the trial court transcripts because they are {no-longer} available, (devoid-missing) in order to raise the defendant’s issues Re: Ineffective Assistance of Trial Counsel; Breach of the Original Plea Bargain; Actual and Factual Demonstrably Innocence