When trial counsel informs the court that he is not prepared for trial and the court's Faretta colloquy does not inquire into the voluntariness of Petitioner's decision to proceed pro se, did the Circuit Court err in concluding Petitioner voluntarily waived his Sixth Amendment right to counsel?

QUESTIONS PRESENTED I. When (a) trial, counsel informs the court that he is not : prepared -for trial; and (b) the court's Faretta colloquy does not : inquire into the voluntariness of Petitioner's decision to proceed pro se; did the Circuit Court err when it concluded Petitioner voluntarily waived his Sixth Amendment right to counsel, because Petitioner affirmed he was ready for trial, when under Faretta v. ~ California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975) and Johnson. v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938), the proper standard for determining the voluntariness of waiver is whether Petitioner's alternative to self—' representation was constitutional Ly offensive? II. Whether Petitioner made a substantial preliminary showing challenging the veracity of the wiretap applicatioris, relating to . "Necessity" (18 U.S.C. §§ invoke his Fourth Amendment right against illegal search and seizure, and his right . to be heard guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause, mandating an evidentiary. hearing in accordance with Franks v. . : Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978) and United States v. Giordano, 416 : U.S. 505 (1974). III. Whether Petitioner made a substantial preliminary showing of "outrageous conduct" by the government to invoke his right to be heard guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause, mandating an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the government engaged in conduct that : . oof , . \