Do claims against a police officer under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for failure to disclose material evidence under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) require a plaintiff to show bad faith by the officer or are such claims governed by a deliberate indifference standard?

QUESTIONS PRESENTED The questions presented by this petition are: 1. Do claims against a police officer under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for failure to disclose material evidence under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) require a plaintiff to show bad faith by the officer as required by the Eighth Circuit, or are such claims governed by a deliberate indifference standard as required by the Seventh and Ninth Circuit? 2. Do the actions of a police officer shock the conscience, and constitute bad faith or deliberate indifference so as to support liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for failure to disclose material evidence under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) when the evidence consisted of a sibling’s general opinion of her sister’s lack of veracity, while acknowledging that she had no personal knowledge of the facts of the particular case? 3. Did the Ninth Circuit depart from the decisions of this Court directing lower courts not to evaluate clearly established law at too high a level of generality for purposes of qualified immunity, by concluding that, at the time of the events in question, it was clear that “police officers had a duty to disclose material impeachment evidence to prosecutors,” without reference to any case law that “‘squarely governs’ the specific facts at issue,” as required by this Court’s decision in Kisela v. Hughes, 138 S. Ct. 1148, 1153 (2018)?