Jason Craig Montgomery v. United States
SocialSecurity Securities Immigration
Does a defendant attempt to persuade, induce, entice, or coerce a minor, within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. §2422(b), where the defendant communicates solely with an adult intermediary and those communications cannot be seen as an effort to overcome the minor's will?
QUESTIONS PRESENTED The Telecommunications Act of 1996, 18 U.S.C. §2422(b), prohibits using interstate communications to “persuade[], induce[], entice[], or coerce[]” a minor to engage in sexual activity. An attempt conviction requires evidence that the defendant possessed the requisite intent and took a substantial step toward completing the crime. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the denial of Petitioner’s motion(s) to dismiss the indictment, for judgment of acquittal and for new trial, concluding that evidence the Petitioner agreed or arranged to have sex with a fictitious, willing minor through an adult intermediary — without communicating with the fictitious minor, or evidence of intent to overcome the minor’s will — and then traveled to meet the fictitious minor, violated 18 U.S.C. §2422(b). The questions presented, on which the Fifth Circuit and the D.C. Circuit are in conflict, are: I. Doesadefendant attempt to persuade, induce, entice, or coerce a minor, within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. §2422(b), where the defendant communicates solely with an adult intermediary and those communications cannot be seen as an effort to overcome the minor’s will? Il. Does an action that might only cause a minor to engage in sexual activity — such as travel to meet the minor in person — satisfy the substantial step requirement of a §2422(b) attempt?