Whether a federal habeas corpus petitioner can invoke the rule of Martinez v. Ryan to show that the ineffectiveness of post-conviction counsel provides 'cause' for the procedural default of an ineffective-assistance-of-trial counsel argument argued as 'cause' for the procedural default of a substantive constitutional claim

QUESTIONS PRESENTED In Edwards v. Carpenter, 529 U.S. 446 (2000) and Justice Breyer’s concurring opinion in Edwards (Id. at 458), this Court and Justice Breyer recognized that when a federal habeas corpus petitioner argues the ineffective assistance of trial counsel as “cause” for the procedural default of a substantive constitutional claim, if that assertion of is also procedurally defaulted, the habeas petitioner may still show “cause” for the default of that “cause” argument. In Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. 1, 18-19 (2012), this Court held that the ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel provides “cause” for the procedural default of a substantial claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. In federal habeas corpus proceedings, Edmund Zagorski claimed that, in violation of the Eighth Amendment and Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978), the trial judge erroneously defined “mitigating evidence” as evidence that “givels] reason for the act” of killing, or “tend[s] to justify” an offense, or “takels] away any of the aggravation of the circumstance.” Such instruction, Mr. Zagorski has maintained, unconstitutionally limited jurors’ consideration of mitigating circumstances of the offense itself, as confirmed by Justice Sotomayor’s opinion dissenting from the denial of certiorari in Hodge v. Kentucky, 568 U.S. 1056 (2012)(Sotomayor, J., dissenting). Mr. Zagorski’s Lockett claim was found procedurally defaulted in federal habeas corpus proceedings, as it was never raised by counsel in state court. And postconviction counsel never alleged that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to raise the Lockett objection. After Martinez, however, Mr. Zagorski filed a motion for relief from judgment under Fed. R.Civ.P. 60(b)(6), asserting that under Martinez, the ineffectiveness of post-conviction counsel now supplies “cause” for any failure, in state court, to raise trial counsel’s ineffectiveness in failing to make the Lockett objection, which in turn provides “cause” for the default of his Lockett claim — thereby allowing him to receive federal review and relief on his Lockett claim. The United States District Court denied relief from judgment concluding that Mr. Zagorski ultimately cannot secure relief on his Lockett claim, because Martinez does not apply under the circumstances. A divided panel of the Sixth Circuit has affirmed. The majority has held that Martinez does not apply and that Mr. Zagorski cannot seek relief under Rule 60(b). Chief Judge Cole disagrees, having concluded that “Zagorski is correct” that under Edwards and Martinez, he can establish “cause;” his claim falls squarely within the Martinez exception; and this Court in Edwards contemplated such a two-layer cause analysis. Moreover, as Chief Judge Cole explains, in seeking to overcome a procedural default, Mr. Zagorski may indeed invoke Rule 60(b), See e.g., Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U.S. 524, 532 n. 4 (2005), and the District Court abused its discretion in denying relief. The questions presented are: 1. Under Edwards v. Carpenter, 529 U.S. 446 (2000), may a federal habeas corpus petitioner invoke the rule of Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. 1 (2012) to show that the ineffectiveness of post-conviction counsel provides “cause” for the procedural default of an counsel argument argued as “cause” for the procedural default of a substantive constitutional claim? See also Edwards, 529 U.S. at 458 (Breyer, J., two-layer cause analysis applicable when a “cause” argument is itself defaulted) 2. May a federal habeas corpus petitioner use Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b) to overcome the procedural default of a substantive constitutional claim by arguing that s/he has “cause” under Martinez for the default of an argument argued as “cause” for the default of that constitutional claim? 3. Is Edmund Zagorski entitled to relief from judgment under Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b)(6) in this capital case, and/or did the District Court abuse its discretion in denying relief, especially where Mr. Zagors