Do prior decisions of this Court compel the conclusion that so long as the jury is properly admonished and instructed, there cannot be a viable claim of prejudicial prosecutorial misconduct in 28 U.S.C. 2254(d) habeas proceedings?

QUESTIONS PRESENTED (1) Do prior decisions of this Court compel the conclusion that so long as the jury is properly admonished and instructed, there cannot be a viable claim of prejudicial prosecutorial misconduct in 28 U.S.C. 2254(d) habeas proceedings? (See, Deck v. Jenkins, 814 F.3d 954, (9th Cir. 2014).) (2) Can the prejudice flowing from a procedurally defaulted claim (which is inexorably intertwined with prejudice from a non-procedurally defaulted claim) be considered in the calculation of whether a federal habeas petitioner has stated a prejudicial prosecutorial misconduct violation under the Fourteenth Amendment? (3) In the context of 28 U.S.C. 2254(d) federal habeas proceedings under the AEDPA, is California's briefing rule (Cal. Rules of Ct., Rule 8.204) adequate as a procedural bar, insofar as it is purportedly firmly established and regularly followed? (See, Johnson v. Lee, 578 U.S. __, 136 S. Ct. 1802 (2016).) (4) In the context of 28 U.S.C. 2254(d) federal habeas proceedings under the AEDPA, is a state court's finding of procedural default completely unassailable, no matter how spurious the finding may be? (See, Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 81, 8791,97 S.Ct. 2497, 53 L.Ed.2d 594 (1977); Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 129, 102 S.Ct. 1558, 71 L.Ed.2d 783 (1982); and Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 728, 111 S.Ct. 2546, 115 L.Ed.2d 640 (1991).) i