Where the trial prosecutor's rationale for striking the lone black juror applied just as well to two white jurors, and the proof that the prosecutor's strike was motivated in substantial part by discriminatory intent was discovered in collateral proceedings, did the Tennessee court's err in failing to apply Foster on collateral review?

QUESTION PRESENTED Where the trial prosecutor’s rationale for striking the lone black juror applied “just as well” to two white jurors, Foster v. Chatman, 136 S. Ct. 1737, 1754 (2016), and just as in Foster, the proof that the prosecutor’s strike was “motivated in 1 If you were to roll a dozen standard dice the odds that you would not roll a single 5 or 6 are the same as the odds that you would end up with an all-white jury in Madison County, Tennessee. The equation: (2/3)!2= 4,096/531,441 = .0077 = 0.77% 2 Not at issue in this petition is the decision of trial counsel to hide from the jury that Mr. Morris was profoundly mentally ill. The only mental disability used to challenge premeditation and presented as mitigation was cocaine intoxication. See Morris v. Bell, No. 07-1084-JDB, 2011 WL 7758570 (W.D. Tenn. Sept. 29, 2011), aff'd in part, vacated in part, remanded sub nom. Morris v. Carpenter, 802 F.3d 825 (6th Cir. 2015). substantial part by discriminatory intent” was discovered in collateral proceedings, did the Tennessee court’s err in failing to apply Foster on collateral review? ii