Does the language in the Mandatory Victim Act (MVRA) allow the courts to forfeit the third party beneficiary's 'Trust Corpus' without an 'Evidentiary Hearing'?

QUESTIONS PRESENTED 1(a): Does the language in the Mandatory Victim Act (MVRA) 18 USCS 3663A, and 21 USCS 853(a), and this court’s opinions in Hughey v. United States, 495 US 411, 109 L.Ed.2d 408, 110 S.Ct.1979 (1990) and in Honeycutt v. United States ,137 S.Ct.1626, 198 L.Ed.73 (2017), allow the courts to forfeit the third party beneficiary's ‘Trust Corpus’ valued at $1.5 million, which is not a proceed of fraud in the plea agreement but later forfeited to compensate the victims towards restitution, without the appropriate party's “Evidentiary Hearing”. 1(b): “Does the counsel's failure to object to the forfeiture of the “Trust Corpus’ within thirty days period of the “the preliminary order of the forfeiture” under 21 USCS 853(n) (2), constitute an “Ineffective Assistance of Counsel” (“IAC”) for the purpose of 28 USCS 2255 (Habeas Corpus Petition) and the Certificate Of Appealability if the Trust was a “Non-dispositive issue” for the defendants to sign the plea agreement and the counsel concedes in his affidavit to the court that “| WAS INEFFECTIVE”(IAC) and the appeal court also cites the same deficient performance of counsel in their opinion. (US v. Sharma 509 Fed Appx. 381(CA5, 2013) and US v. Sharma 585 Fed Appx. 861(CA5, 2014). 2(a): In the Plea Cases, does the language in 18 USCS 3663A, 21 USCS 853(a) and this Court's opinion in Hughey v. United States 495 US 411, 109 L.Ed. 2d 408,110 S.Ct. 1979 : (1990) and in Honeycutt v. United States, 137 S.Ct. 1626, 198 L.Ed. 73(2017), allow restitution and forfeiture to compensate the victims of crime based on a relevant conduct and an allegation that is originally absent in the indictment, plea, plea colloquy, PSR, Pretrial Hearings and directly at the defendant's sentencing hearing and district court's opinion? 2(b): "Based on ‘Ineffective Assistance of Counsel’, did the court of appeals violate Sharma's ‘Due Process’ Right under the Constitutions’ Fifth and Sixth Amendment Rights by denying relief for “evidentiary hearing’ and ‘Certificate Of Appealabilibity' ("COA") where the Defendant was : exclusively ‘assured’ by the counsel that there would be a “credit for legitimate injections services”, a "Non-dispositive issue” for signing the plea-agreement. However, counse''s failure to properly acknowledge and carry the burden to prove, rendered Sharma deprived of any ‘credit’. The counsel conceded in open court that "| was ineffective", based on 18 USCS 3664(e) ["...the burden to show credit for the services is on the defendant..."]; and 42 USCS 1320c-3(a) ["...dispute of medical necessity is best resolved by ‘medical expert’ ..]; and Fifth Circuit's opinion in Sharma |, 703 F.3d 318 (CAS, 2012), ("...the defendants failed to show that not even one injection to even one patient was medically necessary..."). 3 (a} Should the remand by the appellate courts to District Courts be “cabined and limited” as the Fifth Circuit and some other Circuits adopt or “de novo” which is consistent with the majority of the Circuits to protect the ‘DUE PROCESS RIGHT" of the parties under the Fifth (5th) Amendment of the Constitution in such cases, (Sharma |, 703 F.3d 318 (CA5, 2012)? On appeal, should this court allow appellate review of a new issue under the standard of the plain error; harmless error; or NOT AT ALL? 3(b) Reasonable Jurists could differ as to whether District Court correctly determined without an evidentiary hearing that K. Sharma had failed to provide sufficient evidence that Counsel provided ‘Ineffective Assistance of Counsel’ to merit further proceedings in the District Court, which resulted in Sharma’s “COMPLETE LOSS OF LIFE TIME EARNING “WITHOUT a DUEPROCESS’ to Sharma's prejudice . i