Whether forcing the petitioner to serve an excessive punishment of 45 years incarceration for his individual culpability as an accomplice, when the actual killer received only 11 years incarceration, violates the Eighth Amendment's requirement of proportionate punishment based on individual culpability

QUESTION(S) PRESENTED UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION EIGHTH AMENDMENT CONSTITUTIONAL PROPORTIONATE PUNISHMENT INDIVIDUAL CULPABILITY IF, IN 1978, THE CALIFORNIA PAROLE AUTHORITY . SET THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROPORTIONATE’ PUNISHMENT FOR THE, MURDER OF . CHARLIE BAKER AT ELEVEN (11) YEARS !NCARCERATION AND A THREE (3) YEAR PAROLE TERM TO SERVE FOR THE PERPETRATOR'S INDIVIDUAL CULPABILITY [ACTUAL KILLER] OF CHARLIE BAKER; 1S FORCING PETITIONER BARKER TO SERVE THE CONSTI TUT 1ONAL EXCESSIVE PUNISHMENT OF FORTY FIVE (45) YEARS INCARCERATION [TO DATE WITH NO END IN SIGHT) FOR HIS INDIVIDUAL CULPABILITY [ACCOMPLICE LIABILITY AIDER & ABETTOR] IN THE MURDER OF CHARLIE BAKER, A VIOLATION OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTIONAL E1GHTH AMENDMENT ‘°S CONSTITUTIONAL PROPORTIONATE PUNISHMENT WHICH REQUIRES “CRIMINAL CULPABILITY MUST BE LIMITED TO HIS PARTICIPATION IN THE OFFENSE AND HIS PUNISHMENT MUST BE TAILORED TO HIS PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITY,” AS HELD FUNDAMENTAL IN ENMUND vy. FLORDIA, 458 U.S. 782, 801 (1982) #* -If a California LIFER was incarcerated in 1975, his parole relesse was predicated 100Z on The California Supreme Court's ruling in In re Rodriguez (1975) 14 Cal.3d 639, 650-653, both Petitioner Barker and the perpetrator {actual killer] of Charlie Baker were incarcerated in 1975 parole release controlled by Rodriguez, recently unheld in In re Butler (2018) 4 Cal.Sth 728. #* — The perpetrator's Constitutional Proportionate Punishment of ELEVEN (11) YEARS of incarceration for his individual culpability for being the actual killer of Charlie Baker, included being issued his THREE (3) YEARS of “Earned Good Time Credits. “ (Weaver v. Florida, 450 U.S. 24, 32-34 (1981)) ### — Petitioner Barker has [to date] TWENTY (20+) YEARS of “Earned Good Time Credits," and when calculated into his Constitutional Proportionate Punishment produces FORTY FIVE (45) YEARS of incarceration and TWENTY (20+) YEARS of "Earned Good Time Credits" or SIXTY FIVE (65+) YEARS of incarceration for his individual culpability in the crime. (In re Rosnkrantz (2000) 80 Cal.App.4th 409, 423-424 fn 16(conduct credits same as time served) "#e* — Enmund's Constitutional requirements, of Constitutional Proportionate Punishment based on the criminal's individual culpability in the offense and his punishment must be tailored to his personal responsibility, was the LAW in California in 1975, In re Rodriguez (1975) 14 Cal.3d 639, 650-653(primary term must be set constitutionally proportionate to defendant's individual culpability and tailored to his personal culpability in the offense) recently upheld in In re Butler (2018) 4 Cal.Sth 728, 745. : (i) / I. REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION The compelling reason this Court should grant review of this Writ (USSC Rule 10), is to correct the recent decision by the California Supreme Court in In re Butler (Cal.2018) 4 Cal .5th 728, 746("A —ssentence violates the prohibition against unconstitutionally disproportionate sentences only if it is so disproportionate that it ‘shocks the In_re Lynch (Cal. 1972) 8 Cal.3d 410, 424)) This NEW holding and NEW change in the constitutional proportionate punishment based on the defendant's individual culpability in the crime, by the California Supreme Court, is not only in direct contradiction of the State's own constitutional holding's held in In re Rodriguez (1975) 14 Cal.3d 639 650-653(basicly over-ruling Lynch three years after its decision — "shocks the conscience") but is in direct conflict with this Court's precedent case law establishing that the United States Constitution Eighth Amendment sandates “criminal culpability Must be limited to his participation in the offense and his punishment must be tailored to his personal responsibility in the offense." (Engund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 783, 801 (1982); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 305("diminished personal culpability ~the severity of the appropriate punishment necessarily depends on the offender's culpability"); See Also, Solem v. Helms, 463 U.S.