Whether the Sixth Circuit's denial of Petitioner's COA was based on the merits of the appeal rather than whether reasonable jurists could debate the district court's resolution

QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 1. When a Petitioner secks a Certificate Of Appealability(COA): based on whether this Court's decision in Beckles v. United States, 137 S.Ct. 886, affects his Johnson based claim, and in denying Petitioner's COA the Sixth Circuit gathers and forms their own opinion that this Court's decision in Beckles held that "Johnson's reasoning does not apply to the advisory sentencing Guidelines"; does the Sixth Circuit reach its conclusion that reasonable jurist could not debate: the ‘district ‘court's conclusion that Petitioner’is not entitled to relief . based on Johnson,sonly after essentially deciding the case on its merit? And if so, does the Sixth Circuit place too heavy a burden ‘ on the Petitioner at the COA stage? : 2. Whether the Sixth Circuit's denial of Petitioner's COA was based | on whether the Petitioner's appeal would have merit instead of whether reasonable jurist could debate the district court's resolution of . . his constitutional claim, and if so, did the Sixth Circuit exceed the Limited scope of the COA analysis when reviewing Petitioner's application for a COA? . 3. Whether every collateral attack of a sentence under the advisory Guidelines, based on Johnson v. United States, 192 L. Ed. 2d. 569, 576, 135 S. Ct. 2551, 2555, must be a substantive due process claim, a vagueness challenge, and/or a facial challenge to the advisory Guidelines' residual clause, §4B1.2(a)(2): or may a Petitioner , collaterally attack the sentence/judgment and/or §4B1.2(a)(2) relying , on Johnson raising a procedural due Process claim and/or an as-applied constitutional challenge, and if so, on the present record could reasonable jurist at least debate whether this Court's decision in Beckles v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 886, "'squaerly rejects" Petitioner's due process challenge to his sentence/judgment, and/or §4B1.2(a)'s’ residual clause based on Johnson's reasoning? Or, could reasonable jurist at least debate the district court's resolution of Petitioner's constitutional claim? 4. Whether the new rule announced in Johnson v. United States, 192 L. Fd. 24.569, 576, 135 S. Ct. 2551} 2555, is applicable to the advisory Guidelines because it should have retroactive effect according to the second exception in Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 311, 109 S._ ; Gt. 1060, 103 L. Ed. 2d. 334(1998), as a watershed rule of criminal procedure, because the new rule announced in Johnson as-applied to . Petitioner implicates the fundamental fairness of a criminal proceeding? And if so, should this Court decide the retroactivity issue under the context in which it actually applies to the case, before ruling on whether Johnson's rationale is applicable to the advisory Guidelines, so that the proper analysis may govern the case? 5. Whether following Johnson core principles, the vagueness of the residual clause's constitutional implications require that Petitioner's judgment ‘ is void because Johnson implicates the fundamental fairness of a criminal proceeding and/or because the district court's consideration of the vague residual clause means that Petitioner was not afforded ' " @ reasonable opportunity to address the career-offender issues "in : a meaningful manner'', which during the sentencing hearing is a major component of procedural due process? 6. Whether the abeyance procedures instructed by the Sixth Circuit ; Court of Appeals instructed the district court to construe Petitioner's Johnson based due process claim as a vagueness challenge to §4B1.2(a)(2), a facial challenge to §4B1.2(a)(2), or a substantive due process claim because of 4B1.2(a)(2)"s vaguness? And if so, does this allow the district court to construe a Petitioner's pleadings liberally? And if the Sixth Circuit!s instructions did not direct the district court to construe Petitioner's Johnson based due process claim as a vagueness challenge, a facial challenge, and or a substantive due process . claim because of §4B1.2(a)(2), how did the district court com