Whether certain of the 'aggravating circumstances' used by Idaho to determine whether a defendant may be sentenced to death—those that ask whether the crime was especially 'heinous, atrocious or cruel, manifesting exceptional depravity'; whether the defendant exhibited 'utter disregard for human life'; and whether the defendant 'has exhibited a propensity to commit murder'—fail to provide sentencing juries with constitutionally adequate guidance

QUESTIONS PRESENTED To prevent arbitrary imposition of the death penalty, this Court has required use of “clear and objective standards’ that provide ‘specific and detailed guidance” to the sentencing authority responsible for determining whether imposition of a capital sentence is warranted. Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 428 (1980) (footnotes and citations omitted). The Court also has emphasized that “an aggravating circumstance must genuinely narrow the class of persons eligible for the death penalty and must reasonably justify the imposition of a more severe sentence on the defendant compared to others found guilty of murder.” Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 874 (1983). In this case, petitioner contends that Idaho’s capital sentencing regime fails to satisfy both of these requirements. The questions presented are: 1. Whether certain of the “aggravating circumstances” used by Idaho to determine whether a defendant may be sentenced to death—those that ask whether the crime was especially “heinous, atrocious or cruel, manifesting exceptional depravity’; whether the defendant exhibited “utter disregard for human life”; and whether the defendant “has exhibited a propensity to commit murder”—fail to provide sentencing juries with constitutionally adequate guidance. 2. Whether Idaho’s felony-murder aggravating circumstance, which substantially duplicates the State’s felony-murder statute, violates the constitutional requirement that Idaho sufficiently narrow the class of persons subject to the death penalty.