Whether a district court's denial of a motion to dismiss an indictment for a violation of the Speedy Trial Act's 70 day time limit for bringing a defendant to trial is subject to harmless-error analysis

QUESTION PRESENTED The Speedy Trial Act of 1974, as amended, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161-3174, requires the government to bring a criminal defendant who pleads not guilty to trial within 70 days from the filing of an indictment or the defendant’s first appearance before a judicial officer of the court in which the charge is pending, whichever is later. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(c)(1). Certain specifically identified time periods are excluded from the calculation of the 70 day period. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h). Ifthe 70 day time limit, taking into account any exclusions under § 3161(h), is exceeded, the “indictment shall be dismissed on motion of the defendant.” 18 U.S.C. § 3162(a)(2). Dismissal may be “with or without prejudice,” depending on a variety of factors identified in § 3161(a)(2). This case presents two question which have divided the courts of appeals which have considered them. Although the first question was seemingly resolved by this Court in Zedner v. United States, 547 U.S. 489 (2006), two different courts of appeals have reached diametrically opposed answers: 1. Whether a district court’s denial of a motion to dismiss an indictment for a violation of the Speedy Trial Act’s 70 day time limit for bringing a defendant to trial is subject to harmless-error analysis, despite the statute’s mandatory language stating that, in the event of a violation, “the indictment shall be dismissed.” i 2. Even assuming a district court’s denial of a motion to dismiss an indictment for a Speedy Trial Act violation is subject to harmless-error analysis, whether a harmless error finding can be based on the district court’s hypothetical determination that if it had granted the motion to dismiss, it would have dismissed the indictment without prejudice. ii