Whether the Massachusetts statute M.G.L. c.278 sec.33E and the state court judge's decision denying discretionary appellate review for juvenile homicide defendants whose direct appeals were final before Miller v. Alabama is contrary to federal law

QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW This case presents two questions of national importance concerning the federal constitutional rights of juvenile homicide defendants (like Steven James) who were tried for first-degree murder and sentenced as adults and whose direct appeals became final before Miller v. Alabama, 132 S.Ct. 2455, 2468 (2012), and J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 131 S.Ct. 2394 (2011). 1. Where Miller v. Alabama was made retroactively applicable to cases that were final after direct appeal, and because state postconviction courts must provide appellate review of federal constitutional claims in a manner that comports with due process, is the Massachusetts statute M.G.L. c.278 sec.33E (refusing to provide appellate review as a matter of right to a specific group of juveniles convicted of first-degree murder, whose post-Miller requests for relief are denied in the trial courts, because their direct appeal was already final before Miller) and the state court judge’s decision below (that Miller is not “new and substantial” to warrant discretionary appellate review) contrary to clearly established federal law? 2. Where this Court adopted a reasonable juvenile standard in J.D.B. v. North Carolina for custody analysis, and based on the intersection of this Court’s two lines of jurisprudence regarding juvenile brain science and due process rights applied to jury instructions, are jury instructions using an adult reasonable person standard at the trial of a juvenile (to prove murder and disprove manslaughter and self-defense to convict and sentence a juvenile to life in prison), contrary to and an unreasonable application of established federal constitutional law? This Court's resolution of these issues would not only resolve confusion and ii conflict between and within the states, but would also resolve the unconstitutional disparate treatment of similarly situated juvenile homicide defendants in Massachusetts, and would provide much needed guidance to the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court.