Whether a § 2255 motion filed within one year of Johnson, claiming that Johnson invalidates the residual clause of the pre-Booker career offender guideline, asserts a 'right . . . initially recognized' in Johnson within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f)(3)

QUESTIONS PRESENTED In Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015), this Court held unconstitutionally vague the residual clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii). In Welch v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1257 (2016), this Court held that Johnson announced a new substantive rule of constitutional law that applies retroactively to cases on collateral review. Petitioner was sentenced as a career offender under the identical residual clause of the mandatory guidelines in 2002, before United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005). A 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion is timely when filed within one year of “the date on which the right asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if that right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review.” 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f)(3). Petitioner filed a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion within one year of Johnson, asserting that his sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution in light of Johnson. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, following its previous decision in Raybon v. United States, 867 F.3d 625 (6th Cir. 2017), held that Petitioner’s motion was untimely because this Court had not yet held that the mandatory guidelines’ residual clause is void for vagueness, and declined to reach the merits of Petitioner’s claim. The questions presented are: 1. Whether a § 2255 motion filed within one year of Johnson, claiming that Johnson invalidates the residual clause of the pre-Booker career offender guideline, asserts a “right . . . initially recognized” in Johnson within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f)(3). 2. Whether the residual clause of the pre-Booker career offender guideline is unconstitutionally vague. 1