Whether the Ninth Circuit erred in holding that Faretta clearly established a requirement that a request for self-representation must be made at least a few weeks before trial

QUESTIONS PRESENTED This Court held in Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975), that the Sixth Amendment guarantees criminal defendants the right to self-representation at trial. Critically, however, the Court did not explicitly specify when a criminal defendant must invoke this right. At a trial readiness hearing in California state court three days before his jury was impaneled, Petitioner Dalray Kwane Andrews made a clear and unequivocal request to represent himself under Faretta. The state trial court denied Andrews’ request as untimely. The trial court then forced Andrews to proceed to trial with appointed counsel. On direct appeal, the state appellate court affirmed the trial court’s decision, agreeing that Andrews’ request was untimely and additionally holding that it was dilatory. On federal habeas review, the Ninth Circuit concluded the state appellate court’s denial of Andrews’ request on these two grounds was not unreasonable under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Speaking to the timeliness of Andrews’ request, the Ninth Circuit held Faretta “clearly established,” for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), that Andrews had to make his request at least a few weeks before trial. The questions presented here are: (1) Did the Ninth Circuit err in holding that Faretta “clearly established,” for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), that a request for self-representation must be made at least a few weeks before trial? (2) Did the Ninth Circuit err in holding the California Court of Appeal reasonably concluded Andrews’ request for self-representation was dilatory? 1