Whether the district court should address the facts showing a violation of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel post-arraignment and for critical stages due to a 'limited appearance' by arraignment counsel, or should it follow Johnson v. Zerbst hearing procedures

QUESTIONS PRESENTED QUESTION T . Whether in Federal Felony case because of the 6th Amendment of Bill of Rights where the Defense Arraigment Counsel made a “Limited Appearance”, (i.e., one limited to just the Arraignment, so that Defendant would be Pro Se thereafter); and Defendant is Pro Se therefor for the “critical stages” of Plea Negotiations and and the Government admits such; and that there was no Waiver by Defendant of the Right to Counsel whatsoever, the District Court should address the facts rather rather than avoid them ? In sum is the District Court free to ignore the facts showing a violation of the Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel post-Arraignment and for ‘critical stages’ as a result of a “Limited Appearance” by . Arraignment Counsel? or should it follow Johnson v. Zerbst Hearing procedures? QUESTION II Whether when the undisputed underlying facts are that the Court accelerated the time for Defendant to obtain Counsel, then a post-Arraignment Involuntary Pro Se, from 40 days to the same day of the accelerated new date, i.e. from January 10, , 2005 to December 8, 2004 with first notice of the new accelerated date on 12/8/04; and the Court repeatedly enforced the 12/8/04 due date, that that would constitute a denial of Sixth Amendment “Choice of Counsel” for which the District Court can likewise ignore the underlying facts ? Allied is not the choice of Counsel a voidable one because not only made under extremis but also exercised while Defendant had been an involuntary Pro Se for more than 30 days after the Arraignment and after @) 4 : after conducting Pro Se Plea Negotiations and having received (possibly misleading) Discovery— so Choice of Counsel influenced by post-Arraignment Pro Se events ? QUESTION Ll ; When after that Counsel is “chosen” but that Counsel itself elects not to substitute for Defendant Pro Se of Record does not Defendant continue as Pro Se of Record through further ‘critical stages’ so that Counsel is effectively interfering with Defendant’s right to represent himself for: 1) key dispositive motions to dismiss; 2) strategy for trial and conduct of trial; and 3) sentencing inclusive of restitution ? all of which were entirely botched and interfered with by “Counsel not of Record” ?? In short, the above three (3) questions are the issues that ineluctably follow when a Defendants are made to represent themselves because their Arraignment Counsel made a “Limited Appearance”, i.e., an Appearance Limited to the Arraignment, so that Defendant in a Federal Felony prosecution is Pro Se after the Arraignment. There seem to be no reported cases where this has occurred previously and where no inquiry was made to Defendant as to whether he/she wanted Counsel from the after Arraignment time period that Defendant would be Pro Se. But all these problems would logically and obviously follow such scenarios. That’s why this Court has decided that the procedure in Federal Court to. comply with the Sixth Amend; : ment is to have Counsel at all times post-Arraignment. Johnson v, Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938); F.R.CR.P. §44(a); Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 708 (1948). While there are no reported cases on subject it is believed that these practices are widespread. @ \ ra 4 :