Is 18 U.S.C. § 2518 (1) (ce) a statutory provision that reflects Congress' core concerns and does § 2518 (1)(c) require that each request for a wiretap be supported by a separate application?

QUESTIONS PRESENTED 1. Is 18 U.S.C. § 2518 (1) (ce) a statutory provision that reflects Congress’ core concerns and does § 2518 (1)(c) require that each request for a wiretap be supported by a separate application? 2. Does 18 U.S.C. § 2518 (1)(c) authorize any person applying for a wiretap to transfer a statutory showing of necessity from one application to another and piggy~back a subsequent wiretap on necessity that was established for a previous wiretap and . carryover statements from a prior application as to other suspects without making further investigation attempts? . 3. Is the Fourth.Amendment's particularity requirement violated by an application for a wiretap that set forth the purported need to.wiretap a cellular telephone that the government knew had been disconnected almost two weeks before the application was filed, to the extent it deviates from the uniform authorizing requirements that Congress explicitly set out in the Omnibus : Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510 et seq? 4. Does Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978), require a hearing concerning a false or misleading statement that was material to the necessity showing required by 18 U.S.C. § 2518 (1)(e)?s . oo 5. Did the Sixth Circuit ignore Rosales-Mireles v. United States, 138 S.Ct. 1897 (2018), and Molina-Martinez v. United States, 136 S.Ct. 1338 (2016), in finding that the false or misleading statement in Question 4 had been forfeited but not . conducting plain-error review? 6. Is the right at stake in an exclusionary hearing to prevent admission of conversations recorded in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2511 (2)(c) statutory or constitutional and-does the . Fourth Amendment require the court to determine whether a party to a communication consented to an interception within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 2511 (2)(c)? 7. Does the consent requirement in 18 U.S.C. § 2511 (2)(c) pose the same risk of invading the privacy interests of the person consenting under the Fourth Amendment, or a lesser risk of ; invading the consenting person's interests? 8. Was 18 U.S.C § 2511 (2)(c) violated by the government's failure to prove instead of alleging that it monitored and recorded conversations between the petitioner and confidential source 4 an (cS-4) on December 9 and 12, 2013 and confidential source 8 (CS-8) on March 11, March 17, April 9, and April 14, 2014 with their consent and what are the legitimate means of proving consent? 9. Did the government immediately seal the optical disc containing the recorded interceptions or provide a "satisfactory why the delay occurred and why it is excusable--within the meaning of United States v. Ojeda-Rios, 495 U.S. 257 (1990)? : 10. Is the decision in United States v. Carpenter, 138 S.Ct. 2206 (2018), applicable to cases on direct review pursuant to : Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314 (1987). : 11. If so, should the court remand this case for further consideration in light of Carpenter, because data was collected for a substantial time under the Stored Communications Act (SCA), , iii . 18 U.S.C. § 2703, to obtain the petitioner's cell-site location information (CSLI) and that information played a substantial role under 18 U.S.C. § 2518 (1) in setting. forth the basis for ~ a finding of probable cause and in explaining why other less intrusive methods were inadequate, failed, or were too dangerous to try. 12. When CSLI has been obtained without a warrant, in violation of the Fourth Amendment, does Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340 (1987), mean in this context that evidence obtained in good-faith reliance on a statute later ruled unconstitutional need not be excluded?. 13. Does the decision in Dahda v: United States, 584 U.S. ; ___, 138 S.Ct. ,_ 200 L.Ed.2d 842 (2018), require a remand to determine whether the communications intercepted by the government from outside "the territorial jurisdiction of the. court in which the judge is sitting,” 18,U.S.c. § 2518 (3), were integral to the authorizing requirem