Does depriving a criminal defendant of trial counsel against his will, without at least the warnings and voluntary waiver required by Faretta, violate the Sixth Amendment?

QUESTION PRESENTED This Court has repeatedly held that the right to counsel is an essential constitutional protection for the accused, such that serious precautions are necessary before it can be waived away. For example, Argersinger v. Hamlin held “that absent a knowing and intelligent waiver, no person may be imprisoned for any offense, ... unless he was represented by counsel at his trial.” 407 U.S. 25, 37 (1972). And Faretta v. California cautioned that, before a criminal defendant may waive his representation and conduct his own defense, he must “clearly and unequivocally declare[] to the trial judge that he want[s] to represent himself and dloes] not want counsel,” and the record must reflect that he is “voluntarily exercising his informed free will.” 422 U.S. 806, 835-36 (1975). Moreover, this Court has suggested that although “[s]ome rights may be forfeited by means short of waiver,” the right to counsel “may not.” Freytag v. Comm’, 501 U.S. 868, 894 n.2 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). In this case, an indigent capital defendant was forced to represent himself—at his trial and death-penalty sentencing stage—not because he waived the right to representation voluntarily on the record, but as an “extreme sanction” for his alleged misconduct. Courts of last resort are split on whether criminal defendants in any case (let alone capital cases) may be forced to represent themselves pro se in this fashion. The Question Presented is: Does depriving a criminal defendant of trial counsel against his will, without at least the warnings and voluntary waiver required by Faretta, violate the Sixth Amendment?