Whether a defendant's personal knowledge of an exculpatory or favorable fact relieves the State of its duty to disclose evidence

QUESTIONS PRESENTED--CAPITAL CASE 1. Whether a defendant’s personal knowledge of an exculpatory or favorable fact relieves the State of its duty to disclose evidence in its possession proving the existence of the favorable fact and demonstrating the police have dishonestly denied the existence of the exculpatory or favorable fact? 2. Whether a defendant’s personal knowledge of information showing his innocence relieves the State of its duty to disclose exculpatory evidence proving or supporting the defendant’s innocence? 3. Whether the materiality prong of the Brady analysis requires a reviewing court to consider how the undisclosed information would have affected counsel’s strategic choices and what the jury would have been entitled to find if it had heard the undisclosed information impeaching the credibility of the police and the investigation the police had conducted? 4, When a police officer knowingly testifies falsely ina deposition and thereby misleads defense counsel, does that constitute a violation of due process under the Giglio line of cases? 5. Whether under Glossip v. Gross, 576 U. S. (2015), the consideration of the severity and duration of pain likely to be produced under the existing lethal injection protocol and the consideration of whether the availability of an alternative has adequately been shown are to be evaluated holistically or are they separate and distinct steps? i 6. Whether the known probability that some, not all, of those who are executed under a lethal injection protocol will experience pain and the mental anguish the condemned will feel in anticipating that he or she might be one of the unlucky ones who will experience the pain must be considered in determining whether use of such a protocol violates the Eighth Amendment? 7. Whether a condemned inmate must show that a readily available alternative exists if he has established that the existing method of execution creates a substantial risk of severe pain? 8. Whether other states’ use of a method of execution satisfies a condemned inmate’s burden to establish a readily available alternative? 9. When a condemned inmate’s screams as the first drug in the three-drug protocol is administered and the manufacturer has warned that its administration occasionally causes severe pain, can an Eighth Amendment challenge that relies on the inmate’s screams as demonstrative of the infliction of pain be dismissed on the grounds that the claim rests on speculation? ai