Where a numerically-second § 2254 motion raises an actionable Brady/Giglio violation

QUESTIONS PRESENTED--CAPITAL CASE 1. Where a numerically-second § 2254 motion raises an actionable Brady/Giglio violation that (a) the government suppressed until after the conclusion of the defendant’s numerically-first § 2254 motion, and (b) the defendant could not have discovered until the government revealed it, does the Constitution and this Court’s precedent require that the numerically-second § 2254 motion not be subjected to the “gatekeeping” requirements of a “second or successive” motion? 2. Whether the State’s failure to “set the record straight” under Banks v. Dretke when it has withheld favorable information and/or evidence or presented false or misleading testimony during depositions denying the existence of exculpatory material, and the State’s failure to “set the record straight” continues for 24 years through collateral proceedings including a first 2254 petition, can the State’s failure to honor its due process obligation serve to preclude the filing of a “second in time” habeas petition under Panetti v. Quarterman when the Giglio/Brady violations are discovered by happenstance over the State’s objection nearly 24 years after a defendant’s trial and 11 years after the first 2254 petition was denied? 3. Is the Eleventh Circuit’s rule that no matter the circumstances leading up to the late discovery of exculpatory information, any Brady or Giglio claim that arises after the first-in-time habeas petition is filed is to be considered “second or successive” consistent with the exceptions noted by this Court in Panetti v. Quarterman? i 4. Whether nine years after a 2254 petition filed by a petitioner under sentence of death has been denied, a state supreme court’s announcement that the reference in the capital sentencing statute used to impose petitioner’s sentence, facts that a judge was to consider before imposing a death sentence are actually elements of capital murder which the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt under In re Winship in order for a defendant to be death eligible, is a second habeas petition asserting that the petitioner’s death sentence stands in violation of due process under Fiore v. White and Bunkley v. Florida, or a “second in time” petition under Panetti v. Quarterman? di