Whether the residual clause of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)(B) is unconstitutionally vague

question presented herein is whether aiding and abetting Hobbs Act robbery constitutes a crime of violence under the “force” clause of § 924(c)(3)(A). While the First, Tenth, Eleventh, and now the Sixth Circuit have answered this question in the affirmative, see United States v. Garcia-Ortiz, 904 F.3d 102 (1st Cir. Sept. 17, 2018); United States v. Deiter, 890 F.3d 1203, 1215-16 (10th Cir. 2018); In re Colon, 826 F.3d 1301, 1305 (11th Cir. 2016), the reasoning of these circuits appears to conflicts with this Court’s decision in Rosemond v. United States, 572 U.S. 65 (2014). Lastly, the circuit courts are split over the question of whether the categorical approach — or modified categorical approach — is to be employed where a defendant is contemporaneously charged with a crime such as aiding and abetting Hobbs Act robbery and § 924(c). The majority of circuits, including the Second, Sixth, Seventh, and Eighth, have applied the categorical approach as laid out by this Court in Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 576 (1990). United States v. Hill, 890 F.3d 51 (2d Cir. 2018); United States v. Gooch, 850 F.3d 285, 291-92 (6th Cir. 2017); United States v. Rivera, 847 F.3d 847, 848-49 (7th Cir. 2017); United States v. House, 825 ii F.3d 381, 387 (8th Cir. 2016). By contrast, the Third Circuit has rejected the use of the categorical approach in favor of the modified categorical approach in cases involving the contemporaneous charges of Hobbs Act robbery and § 924(c). United States v. Robinson, 844 F.3d 137 (3d Cir. 2016). As such, there is a well-defined circuit split as to which approach is to be applied in cases such as this where a defendant is contemporaneously charged under § 924(c) and Hobbs Act robbery. iii