Whether Congress exceeded its authority under the Commerce Clause in enacting the Unlawful Possession of a Firearm or Ammunition statute

QUESTION PRESENTED I. This Court should use this case to answer the reoccurring, important question whether, when enacting the Unlawful Possession of a Firearm or Ammunition statute (18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), Congress intruded into an area traditionally left to the states’ exercise of the police power and exceeded its authority under the Commerce Clause; whether the courts below have contradicted the plain words of the statute, legislative history, and this Court’s holdings in allowing for convictions that do not comport with the statute’s requirements that the possession of the firearm or ammunition be in or affection interstate commerce or that there be a knowing violation of the statute. Il. Certiorari should be granted to correct the Fifth Circuit’s interpretation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g),which is that the statute requires only that the government prove that the defendant possessed a firearm or ammunition that had been shipped in the unknown past by unknown individual's unrelated to the defendant or his possession of the firearm, and which contradicts the plain words of the statute which require that the defendant “ship or transport in interstate commerce, or possess in or affecting commerce.” Ill. Certiorari should be granted to correct the Fifth Circuit’s error in reading the statutory scheme as requiring only a knowing possession of a firearm or ammunition, in contradiction to the plain language of the statute, which requires a knowing violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) for there to be an offense, the legislative history of the statute ,and this Court’s holdings in Bryan v. United States, 524 U.S. 184, 193 (1998), Flores-Figueroa v. United States, 556 U.S. 646 (2009), Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 618-19 (1994), McFadden v. United States, 135 S.Ct. 2298 (2015), United States v. X-Citement Video, 513 U.S. 64, 72 (1994); Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 423 (1985); Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 273 (1952), all of which hold that if the mens rea is “knowingly,” the government must prove the defendant had knowledge of the facts that constitute the offense? il PARTIES Chad Preston Brewer is the Petitioner; he was the defendant-appellant below. The United States of America is the Respondent; it was the plaintiffappellee below. iii