Stuart Wright v. United States
Environmental SocialSecurity Immigration
Whether the U.S.A.'s failure to 'respond' and the Magistrate Judge's failure to 'deem admitted' conflict with Supreme Court precedent
QUESTIONS PRESENTED This Eighth Circuit decision affirming the Magistrate’s order “reflected a clear misapprehension of summary judgment standards in light of [Supreme Court] precedents” --like what happened in Tolan v. Cotton, 572 US. 650, 659, 184 S.Ct. 1861, 1868 (2014) (per curiam). Ignoring Wright’s detailed facts violated procedural rules and Supreme Court “axiom[s]”, “general rule[s]’, and “fundamental principle[s]” governing summary judgment. Id., 134 S.Ct. at 651, 656, 660. e Supreme Court precedents require that, “The evidence of the nonmovant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505 (1986). That did NOT happen here. e Local Rule 56.1(c) following those precedents was NOT followed: “ A moving party filing reply suggestions “must respond to the non-moving party’s ... additional facts.” U.S.A. did NOT do so. “ “Unless specifically controverted by the moving party, all facts set forth in the statement of the opposing party are deemed admitted .” U.S.A. did NOT specifically “controvert,” and the Magistrate did NOT so “deem.” Thus, the QUESTIONS PRSENTED are as follows: I. Whether the U.S.A.’s failure to “respond” and the Magistrate Judge’s failure to “deem admitted” in ii this case conflict with Supreme Court precedent regarding “the axiom that in ruling on a motion for summary judgment, ‘[t]he evidence of the nonmovant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor.” Tolan v. Cotton, supra, 1348.Ct. at 1863, quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., supra, 477 U.S. at 255. II. Whether the U.S.A.’s failure to “respond” and the Magistrate Judge’s failure to “deem admitted” in this case conflict with Supreme Court precedent regarding the “general rule that a ‘judge’s function’ at summary judgment is not ‘to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial.’ Anderson, 477 U.S., at 249 . Summary judgment is appropriate only if ‘the movant shows that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.’ [FRCP] 56(a). ... a court must view the evidence ‘in the light most favorable to the opposing party.’ Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157, 90 S.Ct. 1598 ... (1970); see also Anderson, supra, at 255. ” Tolan v. Cotton, supra, 134 S.Ct. at 1866. Ill. Whether the U.S.A.’s failure to “respond” and the Magistrate Judge’s failure to “deem admitted” in this case conflict with Supreme Court precedent regarding “the fundamental principle that at the summary judgment stage, reasonable inferences should be drawn in favor of the nonmoving party.” Tolan v. Cotton, supra, 134 S.Ct. at 1868. [emphasis added]