Whether the proof necessary to make a prima facie showing that a petitioner satisfies 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)(B)(ii) is equivalent to the proof necessary to make a showing of actual innocence sufficient to excuse the untimeliness of a petition for writ of habeas corpus

QUESTIONS PRESENTED Ten years after Ian Davis was convicted of aggravated murder and felonious assault, the only alleged eyewitness to the crime admitted, in an unsolicited statement to two Federal Bureau of Investigation Agents, that he never witnessed the crime and that his testimony in Davis’s trial was false. The alleged witness subsequently made similar admissions in a sworn affidavit and a sworn statement, and further revealed that prior to trial, he informed the prosecutor that he was not an eyewitness, and the prosecutor then pressured him to testify. On the basis of the witness’s recantation and the government’s potential due process violation under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), Davis sought — and was granted — authorization by the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit to file a successive petition for writ of habeas corpus. After filing the successive petition, Davis moved the district court for leave to conduct discovery related to the witness’s statements. The district court denied leave to conduct discovery and dismissed Davis’s petition. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding that Davis’s petition was untimely. The questions presented are: 1. Whether the proof necessary to make a prima facie showing that a petitioner satisfies 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)(B)(ii) is equivalent to the proof necessary to make a showing of actual innocence sufficient to excuse the untimeliness of a petition for writ of habeas corpus. 2. Whether, when a court of appeals grants authorization to file a successive petition for writ of habeas corpus and directs the district court to engage in a fuller exploration of a petitioner’s claims, the district court must provide a petitioner the opportunity to provide additional support for his claims. i