Does the California version of its Sexually Violent Predators Act (SVPA) violate the precedents of this Court, and is it therefore unconstitutional?

No question identified. : ae _ QUESTIONS(S) PRESENTED, 1. Does the California version of its Sexually Violent Predators Act (SVPA) violate the precedents of this Court, and is it therefore unconstitutional? .2. Has the State of California, through its Department of State Hospitals, _ departed from professional standards to such a degree that SVPA civil commitment is unconstitutional punishment? (Seling v. Young, 531 U.S. 250, 265 (2001); Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 USS. 71, 82-83 (1992).) ; 3. Is the California version of its SVPA void for vagueness because it _. invites “more unpredictability: and arbitrariness”? (Sessions v. Demaya, . 584 U.S. __, 138 S.Ct. 1204, 1223-1234 (2018).) 4. Is the California SVPA an unconstitutional Bill of Attainder? ‘(Patchat v. Zinke, — U.S. —, 188 S.Ct. 897 (2018); Nixon v. Administrator of General Services, 433 U.S. 425, 475-476 (1977).) 5. Under California law, the prosecution’s expert witness cannot relate . case-specific facts asserted in hearsay statements. (People v. Sanchez (2016) 63 Cal.4th 665.) The admission of this evidence in petitioner’s : civil commitment trial also violated Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 53-56 (2004), which prejudiced this petitioner. Do these violations require reversal of petitioner’s indefinite involuntary civil commitment _on Constitutional grounds? , 6. a. Does the State of California’s departure from professional standards require reversal and dismissal in this case by this Court because of insufficient evidence to find petitioner was a sexually violent predator . who suffered from an actual “diagnosed mental disorder”? | b. Did the State of California’s denial of a jury instruction (a unanimous jury finding where multiple acts are argued in the alternative to constitute a single crime)—requiring the ‘finding of the “mental disorder | that predisposed [petitioner] to commit sexually violent behavior’ —deny petitioner his rights to Due Process of Law and a jury trial? (Richardson . v. United States, 526 U.S. 813, 816-817 (1999); Schad v. Arizona, 501 7 U.S. 624, 634, fn 5 (1991).) : c. In the circumstances of this case, should petitioner's civil commitment be reversed because of. an impermissibly vague jury instruction (Le., CALCRIM No. 3454)? .