Whether the government's statutory authority to detain Mr. al-Alwi has unraveled

QUESTIONS PRESENTED In Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 520 (2004), this Court understood the Authorization for Use of Military Force to include implicit authority to detain for the duration of the relevant conflict combatants who fought U.S. forces in Afghanistan. It cautioned, however, that “lilf the practical circumstances of a given conflict are entirely unlike those of the conflicts that informed the development of the law of war, that understanding may unravel.” Twice in the past decade, that prescient warning was repeated. See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 797-98 (2008) (“Because our Nation’s past military conflicts have been of limited duration, it has been possible to leave the outer boundaries of war powers undefined. If, as some fear, terrorism continues to pose dangerous threats to us for years to come, the Court might not have this luxury.”); Hussain v. Obama, 572 U.S. 1079 (2014) (statement of Breyer, J., respecting denial of certiorari) (noting the Court had not “considered whether ... either the AUMF or the Constitution limits the duration of detention” when the conflict’s circumstances are entirely unlike those of prior conflicts). Today, seventeen years after the United States detained Moath al-Alwi at Guantanamo Bay, the questions presented are: I. Whether the government’s statutory authority to detain Mr. al-Alwi has unraveled. II. Alternatively, whether the government’s statutory authority to detain Mr. al-Alwi has expired because the conflict in which he was captured has ended. ii QUESTIONS PRESENTED—Continued Ill. Whether the Authorization for Use of Military Force authorizes, and the Constitution permits, detention of an individual who was not “engaged in an armed conflict against the United States” in Afghanistan prior to his capture.