Whether the presumption in § 407(b)(2) comports with the Due Process Clause as to the State's burden of proof

QUESTION PRESENTED FOR REVIEW Section 407(b)(2) of the Illinois Controlled Substance Act enhances the penalty of an unlawful delivery when it occurs within 1,000 feet of “a church, synagogue, or any other building, structure, or place used primarily for religious worship.” To obtain the enhancement, the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the alleged building functions as a place used primarily for religious worship. But the Illinois Supreme Court held that where the alleged building or structure has the traditional characteristics associated with churches or synagogues, the State does not have to prove that it functions primarily as a place of religious worship. The Illinois Supreme Court found this holding ; supported because “the legislature has already determined that a church or synagogue meets that requirement.” The Illinois Supreme Court also held that for other—or groups, § 407(b)(2) requires the State to present additional evidence that the structures are used primarily for religious worship. The questions presented are: 1. Whether the presumption in § 407(b)(2)— that structures with traditional characteristics associated with churches or synagogues are places used primarily for religious worship—comports with the requirements of the Due Process Clause as to the State’s burden of proof. 2. Whether the State’s standard of proof—that structures with traditional characteristics associated with churches or synagogues are irrefutably presumed to be places used primarily for religious worship—provides greater criminal protections for traditional Judeo-Christian places of worship, in° violation of the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.