Should this Court revisit its precedent to consider whether death-sentenced inmates are entitled to the effective assistance of counsel on initial collateral review in state court?

QUESTION PRESENTED David Riley filed a pro se state post-conviction petition because, unlike every other state, Alabama does not provide counsel to death-sentenced inmates to file collateral attacks to their capital convictions. The trial court appointed an attorney for Mr. Riley, and the sum total of that attorney’s actions were to visit Mr. Riley once and read aloud from his pro se pleading at an “evidentiary” hearing where she put on no evidence, while telling the court that she did not know how to prove Mr. Riley’s case. The Alabama courts held that because this Court’s precedent concluded that Mr. Riley was not entitled to post-conviction counsel, he was not entitled to effective assistance of such counsel; therefore, he was not entitled to new capital post-conviction proceedings. Should this Court revisit its precedent to consider whether deathsentenced inmates are entitled to the effective assistance of counsel on initial collateral review in state court? i