Whether the District Court and Circuit Court Judges have a duty to abide by the Constitution and rule per the Law of the Case and Law of the Land

QUESTIONS PRESENTED 1. Whether the District Court and Circuit Court Judges have a duty to abide by the Constitution and rule per the Law of the Case and Law of the Land. I. 2. Whether the (decades long) concerted use of the Re-examination process (excluding the targeted invention’s (contractually induced) ‘Patent Prosecution History Estoppel’ provision) without legislative authority by the USPTO, its certified Patent Attorneys, its Appeals Board (herein, “the Executive Agency’), and the Federal Circuit Courts (herein, “the Judiciary”) rescinding Government-issued patent contract grants prior to legislative enactment of America Invents Act of 2011 and thereafter (herein, “the Legislature”) knew (or should have known) of J. Marshall’s res judicata finding that ‘Grants are Contracts’ and stare decisis ‘First Impression Mandated Prohibition’ against rescinding government-issued contract grants. If not, : A. Whether the (decades long) concerted use of the Re-examination process (excluding the targeted invention’s (contractually induced) ‘Patent Prosecution History Estoppel’ provision) without legislative authority by the USPTO, its certified Patent Attorneys, its Appeals Board knew (or should have known) that — failing to consider an invention’s (contractually induced) ‘Patent Prosecution History Estoppel’ provision constituted an overt breach of contract. If not, B. Whether the (decades long) concerted use of the Re-examination . process (excluding the targeted invention’s (contractually induced) ‘Patent Prosecution History Estoppel’ provision) without legislative authority by the USPTO, its certified Patent Attorneys, its Appeals Board knew (or should have known) that — rescinding the contract grant constituted an erroneously unauthorized adjudicative taking of substantive and fundamental ‘due process’ rights and remedies relied upon by the inventor; a process normally reserved for the Judiciary to so adjudicate. If not, ; C. Whether the (decades long) concerted use of the Re-examination process (excluding the targeted invention’s (contractually induced) ‘Patent Prosecution History Estoppel’ provision) without legislative authority by the USPTO, its certified Patent Attorneys, its Appeals Board knew (or should have known) that — reexamining a patent contract grant without considering the u a targeted invention’s (contractually induced) ‘Patent Prosecution ' History Estoppel’ is no reexamination at all or a fraudulent one at best; on venue constituted ‘fraud on the Federal Circuit Court’ inducing it to entertain an unauthorized and questionably re-examined breached contract grant. Il. 8. Whether the Legislature knew (or should have known) of J. Marshall’s ‘First Impression Mandated Prohibition’ and the Executive Agency’s (decades long) mal-administration of the ‘Reexamination Process’ (void of targeted ‘Patent Prosecution History Estoppel’ consideration) at the time it provisioned the Executive Agency’s (colorful) ‘authorization to continue-in-concert with the Judiciary’ without considering targeted ‘Patent Prosecution History Estoppel.’ [Reference Aqua Products.]. Ifnot, A. Whether the Legislature knew (or should have known) that the Legislature’s 2011 America Invents Act (“AIA”) ‘Provisional Act’ authorizing the Executive Agency to continue its (decades long) maladministration of the ‘Reexamination Process’ (void of targeted ‘Patent Prosecution History Estoppel’ consideration) — was an ‘artificially (corrupt) distinction, not an authorization’ —used to color the decades long unauthorized (breach of contract grants) abrogated adjudications in concert with the Judiciary. If not, B. Whether the Legislature knew (or should have known) that the Legislature’s 2011 America Invents Act (“AIA”) ‘Provisional Act’ authorizing the Executive Agency to continue its (decades long) maladministration of the ‘Reexamination Process’ (void of targeted ‘Patent Prosecution History Estoppel’ consideration) — constituted simultaneously an adjudicative