Is the definition of 'crime of violence' in 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)(B) unconstitutionally vague?

QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 1. Is the definition of “crime of violence” in 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)(B) unconstitutionally vague, given the Court’s holding in Sessions v. Dimaya, 138 S.Ct. 1204 (2018) that the identical definition in 18 U.S.C. § 16(b) is unconstitutionally vague in light of Johnson v. United States, 135 §.Ct. 2551 (2015)? 2. Can a Hobbs Act robbery under 18 U.S.C. § 1951(b) categorically be a “crime of violence” as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)(A), if the offense is indivisible, and juries in three circuits are routinely instructed according to those circuits’ pattern instructions that the “property” taken may include “intangible rights” and the offense may be committed by simply causing the victim to “fear harm” which includes “fear of financial loss as well as fear of physical violence”? 38. Did the Eleventh Circuit err under Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 336-38 (2003) and Buck v. Davis, 137 S.Ct. 759, 773-74 (2017) in denying Petitioner a certificate of appealability based upon adverse circuit precedent, when all of the above issues are nonetheless debatable among reasonable jurists? i INTERESTED PARTIES There are no