1. Whether the New York State offense of robbery in the third degree is a "violent felony" under the elements clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act ("ACCA"), 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(b)(i), when the least of the acts that may have constituted the offense includes purse snatching.

2. A federal prisoner making a "second or successive" habeas petition, under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, must show that "the claim relies on" a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable. Id. § 2244(b)(2)(A). Here, Petitioner argued that his claim, in his successive § 2255 motion, "relie[d] on" the rule of Johnson v. United States, 135 S.Ct. 2551 (2015) -- which invalidated ACCA's "residual clause" as void for vagueness and is retroactive to cases on collateral review -- since his prior robbery conviction indisputably qualified under the residual clause, regardless of whether it also fit under the elements clause. Petitioner thus could not successful ly attack his ACCA sentence until Johnson eliminated the residual clause. The Court of Appeals held, however, that petitioner's challenge to his prior New York robbery conviction could not possibly rely on Johnson because the district court's finding that New York robbery was an ACCA predicate had rested on the "elements" clause, not the residual clause.

The question presented is: Whether, on a second or successive § 2255 motion, the movant's claim relies on Johnson's invalidation of the residual clause when the original sentencing court rested its ACCA-finding on the elements clause rather than the residual clause.

Whether the New York State offense of robbery in the third degree is a 'violent felony' under the elements clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act