Whether the sentencing scheme under Louisiana's Habitual Offender Law is subject to the jury requirements of the Sixth Amendment

QUESTION(S) PRESENTED | 1. Reasonable jurists would determine that the sentencing scheme by the State of Louisiana's Habitual Offender Law, LSA-R.S. 15:529.1 AG)(b) [formally enacted as LSA-R.S. 15:529.1 A(1)(b)G)], subject to the jury requirements of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution. 2. Jurists of reason would argue that: (1) in accordance to an independent sentencing enhancement statute (LSA-R.S. 15:529.1, et seq.) proof of a fact is an essential element to enhancing a defendant's penalty after he has been convicted for vielating any other criminal statute (that essential fact being the existence of a prior felony conviction); and, (2) through this enhancement provision, the penalty for the underlying offense may be completely altered unto a mandatory minimum sentence of life in prison, which ends up being a sentence that is well-above the statutory maximum penalty prescribed by the statute of which that the defendant had originally been convicted of violating; and, (3) does the Sixth Amendment require that such essential fact be subjected to the reasonable doubt standard? Mr. Lanienx answers yes. : 3. Reasonable jurists would determine that the above cited Habitual Offender Law operates in contrast to the rules and policies promulgated by this Court pursuant to US. v. Booker, 125 §.Ct. 738, 843 U.S. 220 (2005); and Blakely y. Washington, 124 $.Ct. 2531, 542 U.S. 296. : Mr. Lanieux answers yes. 4. Reasonable jurists would debate that the above cited Habitual Offender Law cause Mr. Lanieux to be denied his Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial.