Could reasonable jurists debate whether a court may permit an amendment to an initial habeas corpus petition, without applying 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)'s limitations on 'second or successive' petitions, when appellate proceedings after a denial of that initial petition are ongoing?

QUESTIONS PRESENTED CAPITAL CASE After this Court decided Pena-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855 (2017), Charles Rhines sought relief on the basis of juror statements indicating that antigay stereotypes and animus had affected his jury’s decision to sentence him to death. He moved a federal district court for leave to amend his initial petition for a writ of habeas corpus to include the statements while an appeal from the court’s earlier denial of that initial petition was pending in the Eighth Circuit. One juror who had voted for death stated that “we also knew that [Mr. Rhines] was a homosexual and thought that he shouldn’t be able to spend his life with men in prison.” A second juror indicated about deliberations: “One juror made...acomment that if he’s gay, we’d be sending him where he wants to go if we voted for [life imprisonment without the possibility of parole].” And a third juror noted that there had been “lots of discussion of homosexuality” and “a lot of disgust.” The district court ruled that Mr. Rhines’s motion constituted an unauthorized “second or successive” habeas petition, though the Courts of Appeals are divided on whether that term of art applies automatically after a district court has issued an appealable disposition of an initial petition, but before appellate proceedings as to that initial petition have concluded. The court then declined to issue a certificate of appealability, as did the majority of a three-judge panel of the Highth Circuit. The questions presented are: Could reasonable jurists debate whether a court may permit an amendment to an initial habeas corpus petition, without applying 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)’s limitations on “second or successive” petitions, when appellate proceedings after a denial of that initial petition are ongoing? Could reasonable jurists debate whether Petitioner has made a substantial showing of a violation of his right to an impartial jury with evidence that at least one juror relied on anti-gay stereotypes and animus in sentencing him to death?