Whether the Due Process Clause permits a judge or factfinder to rely on a person's criminal history to conclude that he or she likely committed another crime in non-sex-offense cases

QUESTIONS PRESENTED Relying on historical practice dating back to English cases in the seventeenth century, the courts of appeals had consistently held that relying on a person’s criminal history to conclude that he or she has a propensity for criminal behavior, and so likely committed another crime, violates due process in non-sex-offense cases. In 1991, however, this Court in Estelle v. McGuire expressly reserved ruling on the question of whether it violates the Due Process Clause to use “prior crimes” evidence to show propensity to commit a charged crime. Since then, the lower courts have expressed uncertainty regarding whether propensity evidence violates the Due Process Clause. The court of appeals below went so far as to hold that constitutional due process does not preclude a judge from relying on a person’s criminal history to conclude that he likely committed another crime and thereby violated the terms of his supervised release. The questions presented are: (1) In cases not involving sex offenses, does the Due Process Clause permit a judge to revoke a person’s supervised release by relying on a person’s criminal history to conclude that he or she likely committed another crime? (2) In cases not involving sex offenses, does the Due Process Clause permit a factfinder to rely on a person’s criminal history to conclude that he or she likely committed another crime? i