Whether a court must categorically deny a Rule 60(b)(6) motion premised on the change in decisional law produced by Martinez v. Ryan

QUESTIONS PRESENTED In Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722 (1991), this Court held that a federal habeas petitioner who has procedurally defaulted a claim by failing to raise it in state court may not excuse that default by pointing to negligence of postconviction counsel. In Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. 1 (2012), and Trevino v. Thaler, 569 U.S. 413 (2013), this Court carved out an important exception to that rule, allowing petitioners to raise an ([ATC) claim for the first time in federal court if that claim was defaulted through ineffective assistance of postconviction counsel in state court. After Martinez and Trevino were decided, some some on death row—filed motions under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(6), asking the courts to reopen judgments premised on the new “cause” exception to default. There is an acknowledged disagreement in the circuits regarding the rule for deciding those motions. Four circuits have held that such motions must be rejected, adopting a per se rule against granting Rule 60(b)(6) motions premised on Martinez. By contrast, three circuits hold that Rule 60(b)(6) motions premised on Martinez may be granted in appropriate circumstances. The questions presented are: 1. Must a court categorically deny a Rule 60(b)(6) motion premised on the change in decisional law produced by Martinez? 2. If the Court declines to grant plenary review, should the Court summarily reverse the Fifth Circuit’s denial of a Certificate of Appealability to allow for full briefing and argument on the proper treatment of Raby’s Rule 60(b)(6) motion premised on Martinez? i