Is federal carjacking by intimidation not a crime of violence under the elements clause of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)(A) because the offense fails to require any intentional use, attempted use, or threatened use of violent physical force?

QUESTION PRESENTED FOR REVIEW At the time Mr. Newton committed the offense, section 2119 defined a carjacker as “[w]hoever, possessing a firearm as defined in section 921 of this title, takes a motor vehicle that has been transported, shipped, or received in interstate or foreign commerce from the person or presence of another by force and violence or by intimidation, or attempts to do so[.] 18 U.S.C. § 2119 (1993). This was a general intent crime. Congress later amended this statute to add a specific intent element. This specific intent required the carjacker to act “with intent to cause death or serious bodily injury[.]” 18 U.S.C. § 2119 (1994) (emphasis added). The question presented is: Is federal carjacking by intimidation not a crime of violence under the elements clause of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)(A) because the offense fails to require any intentional use, attempted use, or threatened use of violent physical force? i