Whether the Ninth Circuit contravened the Supreme Court's holding in Holbrook v. Flynn by finding that the defendant-specific security measures employed during the petitioner's trial were not inherently prejudicial

QUESTION PRESENTED 1. In Holbrook v. Flynn, 475 U.S. 560, 570-72 (1986), the Court held that the mere presence of guards at a trial was not so inherently prejudicial that the respondent was denied his constitutional right to a fair trial. In so holding, the Court explained that guards should be strategically placed throughout the courtroom to avoid adhering prejudice to a defendant, but that more defendant-specific security would be inherently prejudicial. Jd. at 569. During Petitioner’s trial, despite his nonviolent past, and without an individualized determination that excess security was necessary, a U.S. Marshal remained seated next to Petitioner while he testified and physically escorted him from the witness stand to counsel table in the presence of the jury. The court of appeals summarily affirmed and found this practice was not inherently prejudicial. Did the Ninth Circuit contravene Flynn? 2. In Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224 (1998), this Court held that, even when the fact of a prior conviction increases the defendant’s statutorymaximum penalty, it is not an element that must be proven to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. Should the Court overrule Almendarez-Torres? Prefix