Should judges be liable under section 1983 for intentional conduct characterized as judicial acts but prohibited by statute, caselaw, or criminal statute?

Questions Presented , 1. Should this great court reconsider the doctrine of Absolute Judicial immunity and allow judges to be liable under section 1983 via a qualified immunity standard for intentional conduct that may be characterized as a judicial act but nonetheless is expressly prohibited by statute, caselaw, or criminal statute, in light of Judges using the Judicial system for pre-planned Convict leasing, slavery, and Human trafficking schemes such as the Kids For Cash Scheme and the Trash For Cash scheme alleged in this petitioners case, and in light of considerable evidence that at the time of it’s enactment, most members of Congress believed judges would be ; ; liable under § 1983, and that immunity was much more widely accepted for legislators than it was for judges at the time the act was passed. 2. While Petitioner is humbled and incredibly appreciative of it’s reversal and landmark ruling that Petitioner stated claims, and may go forward with Human Trafficking violations, 13 Amendment Slave labor violations, 8° amendment violations, and racketeering violations, did the Third Circuit Court of Appeals nevertheless err in making all the other defendants liable while letting the judges , involved off the hook by refusing to recognize Convict leasing, slave labor, and human Trafficking as grounds for denying Jurisdiction to the defendant Judges in this case under Dennis v. Sparkman, where statutory and case law clearly forbid ‘ and out law such a practice as ordering civil Child support oblogors to forced labor, whether at a private or state facility, just as the child support orders and the void May 22, 2014 order did in this case. 3. Did the Appellate Court err in affirming quasi-judicial immunity for Domestic ; Relations officers, who were acting as a complaining witness and not a judicial officer when they lied in their affidavit seeking an arrest warrant of Petitioner, in violation of This courts ruling in Kalina v. Fletcher 522 U.S. 118 (1997). . 4. Did the appellate Court err in refusing to find petitioners first amendment rights to attend church services were violated when petitioner was held as a prisoner as part of a convict leasing , human trafficking, and slave labor scheme. 5. Did the appellate Court err in affirming denial of petitioners motion for the recusal Of Judge Robert Mariani in light of petitioners FTCA complaint against ‘him. 2 . < . a CO II.