Whether the petitioner is categorically ineligible for the death penalty because he lacked the requisite minimal culpability under the Eight and Fourteenth Amendments for a death sentence?

QUESTIONS PRESENTED Jeffery Wood is on death row in Texas despite the fact that he did not kill anyone. Mr. Wood was convicted of capital murder and sentenced to death under Texas’s “law of parties.” He was held responsible for the actions of another man, who shot a clerk in a Kerrville convenience store in 1996. Mr. Wood was in a truck outside the building when it occurred, without knowledge that his co-defendant was capable of killing or would kill anybody. At the penalty phase of his trial, the State relied heavily on the testimony from discredited psychiatrist Dr. James Grigson (also known as “Dr. Death”) to prove that Mr. Wood, who had no prior criminal, was a future danger. Prior to Mr. Wood’s trial, Dr. Grigson had been expelled from the American Psychiatric Association and the Texas Society of Psychiatric Physicians after those entities found it was an ethical violation for him to provide the same type of testimony he provided at Mr. Wood’s trial. Mr. Wood’s trial attorneys did not cross examine the State’s witnesses or present any evidence at the penalty phase. Consequently, the jury made its sentencing determination without the benefit of an adversarial proceeding. The jury instructions at both phases of trial did not require that the jury find Mr. Wood had the requisite level of culpability under either Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982) or Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137 (1987). The questions presented are: 1. Whether the petitioner is categorically ineligible for the death penalty because he lacked the requisite minimal culpability under the Eight and Fourteenth Amendments for a death sentence? 2. Have standards of decency evolved such that the Eighth Amendment prohibits imposing a death sentence on a person who did not kill or intend to kill? 3. When a capital judgment has been predicated on an assessment of an individual’s likelihood of future dangerousness, does the due process clause require a new judgment after the passage of time causes material changes in the circumstances and evidence on which the original judgment was based? i