Whether a trial court may deny a DNA application in a capital case based solely on the untested hearsay of the prosecuting attorney and in contravention to this Court's precedent

QUESTIONS PRESENTED In 1988, before DNA was widely available as a forensic tool, Melvin Bonnell was convicted and sentenced to death. Trial testimony established that blood and other biological matter was spattered and pooled throughout the scene. Additionally, Bonnell’s hands were bagged to preserve evidence, and swabs and/or slides were made from evidence collected from his hands; Bonnell’s clothes were seized; his car was processed; and the victim’s body and clothes contained biological evidence. Thus, the crime scene and Bonnell’s person and clothes were evidentiary goldmines. Bonnell sought DNA testing of this evidence in the state courts. In response, the prosecuting attorney claimed that all the evidence had vanished or was destroyed. The trial court accepted, in total, the untested hearsay of the prosecuting attorney when it denied Bonnell’s request. Thus, Bonnell’s case raises two critical concerns of national importance: 1. Whether a trial court may deny a DNA application in a capital case based solely on the untested hearsay of the prosecuting attorney and in contravention to this Court’s precedent. 2. Whether a trial court’s decision to accept, in total, the untested hearsay of the prosecutor attorney when denying DNA testing in a capital case should be reviewable on appeal. i