Whether Dominguez Benitez's harmless error rule applies to Rule 11(b)(1)(G)'s requirement that before a guilty plea can be accepted the district court must ensure that the defendant understands the nature of the charges against him?

QUESTION PRESENTED _The Second Circuit agreed that the district court committed error when it accepted petitioner's plea without ensuring that he “understood the nature” of the charges to which he was pleading guilty. United States v. Lloyd, 901 F.3d 111, 115 (2d Cir. 2018). Moreover, the Second Circuit concluded that petitioner presented “a colorable argument that [petitioner] might have been confused about the complexities of the Pinkerton-based firearms charge, in which he bears criminal liability for his codefendant’s firearms possession.” Jd. at 122. Nevertheless, the Second Circuit refused to vacate petitioner's plea because he was “unable to identify any aspect of the record suggesting that, had the District Court explicitly reviewed the elements of that liability with him at his change-of-plea hearing, he would not have entered a plea of guilty” to the firearms count. /d. In support of its troubling holding the Second Circuit cited this Court’s decision in United States v. Dominguez Benitez, 542 U.S. 74 (2004), which held that a “defendant who seeks reversal of his conviction after a guilty plea, on the ground that the district court committed plain error under Rule 11, must show a reasonable probability that, but for the error, he would not have entered the plea.” 542 U.S. at 83. Even Dominguez Benitez recognized that such a rule does not apply to all Rule i errors: when the record of a criminal conviction obtained by guilty plea contains no evidence that a defendant knew of the rights he was putatively waiving, the conviction must be reversed. We do not suggest that such a conviction could be saved even by overwhelming evidence that the defendant would have pleaded guilty regardless, 1 t 4 See id. at 84 n.10 (citing Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969)). Ensuring that a defendant receives “real notice of the true nature of the charge against him,” the purpose of Rule 11(b)(1\(G) is “the first and most universally recognized requirement of due process.” Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U.S. 637, 645 (1976). Asa result, this petition raises the following question of importance, and over which the : Circuits are divided: : Whether Dominguez Benitez's harmless error rule applies to Rule 11(b)(1)(@)’s requirement that before a guilty plea can be accepted the district . court must ensure that the defendant understands the nature of the charges against him? | 2 .