Whether a second or successive habeas petitioner asserting that his sentence is invalid under Johnson II must show that the sentencing court relied exclusively on the ACCA's residual clause when the sentencing record is silent on the issue

QUESTION PRESENTED Petitioner Anthony Barrett received a sentence enhancement pursuant to the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) (“ACCA”) based upon prior convictions qualifying as predicate offenses. At the time he was sentenced, the trial court did not specify which of the three provisions of the ACCA—the elements clause, the enumerated clause, or the residual clause—served as the basis for the enhancement. This Court subsequently held that the ACCA’s so-called “residual clause” was void for vagueness, and therefore predicate offenses falling within the residual clause could not constitutionally support a sentence enhancement under the ACCA. Johnson v. United States, 135 8. Ct. 2551 (2015) (“Johnson IT’). The next year, the Court held that Johnson II announced a new rule of constitutional law retroactively applicable on collateral review. See Welch v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1257, 1265 (2016). Mr. Barrett brought a second 28 U.S.C. § 2255 petition relying on Johnson IT, but the district court held that he could not take advantage of that decision because he could not demonstrate that the original sentencing court relied exclusively on the now-void residual clause. Deepening a well-established circuit split, the court of appeals affirmed. The question presented is thus: Whether a second or successive habeas petitioner asserting that his sentence is invalid under Johnson IT must show that the sentencing court relied exclusively on the ACCA’s residual clause when the sentencing record is silent on the issue. i