Whether the ambiguousness of the term 'material' within Title 18 USC 2252A(a)(2)(B) gives unintended breadth to District Courts to accept pleas of guilt without subject-matter jurisdiction

QUESTION(S) PRESENTED 1. In light of United States v Peter, 310 F.3d 709 (11th Cir 2002), does the ambiguousness of the nature of the texm "material" within Title 18 : USC 2252A(a)(2)(B), give the unintended breadth by: (A) authorizing District Courts to accept pleas of guilt without subject-matter jurisdiction, wherefore caprical use of elastic language is construed as a computer file, rather than disk, so long as the file "contains" an unlawful: depiction; thereby, (B) substituting factual conduct in . violation of United States v Edmond, 780 F.3d 1126 (11th Cir 2015); by modifying statutory elements in order to convict innocent persons of a . crime for which they are not indicted? 2. When a prisoner alleges thorny constitutional issues, states facts and cites the law, in relation to and in support of such claims: (A) does a district court's catch=all denial, or failure to adjudicate all claims : uv alleged, violate habeas procedure, when its decision runs contrary to the : ; procedural rule established under Clisby v Jones, 960 F.2d 925 (4th Cir 7992), thereby, serving to render habeas review futile, as applied to that case; Likewise, (B) does a Court of Appeal 's failure to clarify its blanket denial, of meritorious issues, violate a claimant's due process right toa meaningful opportunity to present such claims on habeas seview, . and/or place too significant of a burden at this mere propositional stage, during a COA's threshold inquiry, as re-established in Buck v Davis, 132 S.Ct. 759 (2017)? , ek . .